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ABSTRACT
Using a new database of islands throughout the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans we examine
whether colonial origins affect modern economic outcomes.  We argue that the nature of discovery
and colonization of islands provides random variation in the length and type of colonial experience.
We instrument for length of colonization using wind direction and wind speed.  Wind patterns which
mattered a great deal during the age of sail do not have a direct effect on GDP today, but do affect
GDP via their historical impact on colonization.  The number of years spent as a European colony
is strongly positively related to the island’s GDP per capita and negatively related to infant mortality.
This basic relationship is also found to hold for a standard dataset of developing countries.  We test
whether this link is directly related to democratic institutions, trade, and the identity of the colonizing
nation.  While there is substantial variation in the history of democratic institutions across the
islands, such variation does not predict income.  Islands with significant export products during the
colonial period are wealthier today, but this does not diminish the importance of colonial tenure.
The timing of the colonial experience seems to matter.  Time spent as a colony after 1700 is more
beneficial to modern income than years before 1700, consistent with a change in the nature of
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Understanding the variation in income across countries remains one of economics' most 
important research questions.  Many authors have explored the links between colonialism 
and modern day outcomes, though little consensus exists.  Historians and political 
scientists have emphasized the long term negative consequences of colonial rule 
including the possible inability of former colonies to transition to a stable form of self 
government or the possible negative effects of resource extraction (see for example 
Rodney [1974]).  In this paper we show that time spent as a colony is strongly positively 
correlated with modern economic outcomes across islands.   
 
Recent economic work on the importance of institutions has shifted the focus of 
empirical growth toward colonialism.  La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
[1997, 1998] show that former colonies of English common law countries have more 
developed capital markets than former colonies with French civil law.  Banerjee and Iyer 
[2005] look at the effect of differences in colonial property rights institutions in India.  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson [2001, 2002] show that the form of colonization 
(extractive versus heavy settlement by Europeans) tended to determine the type of 
institutions created in the country and therefore strongly affected modern outcomes.   
 
Obviously causality is problematic in considering the effect of institutions on growth.  
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny [2004] argue that human capital 
causes growth and rich countries then adopt good institutions.  The literature has 
attempted to deal with this through the use of instrumental variables, but finding 
appropriate instruments is difficult.  Mauro [1995] uses ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
to instrument for corruption.  Hall and Jones [1999] use the distance from the equator as 
an instrument, arguing that this determines the degree of European influence.  In neither 
case is it clear that the instrument does not have a direct effect on output.  In a paper 
focusing on Indian states, Iyer [2005] uses the deaths of rulers lacking male heirs as an 
instrument for the degree of British colonial control.  Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
[2001, 2002] argue that the death rates of settlers provide a useful instrument for modern 
  2institutions.  This approach has not been without critics.  McArthur and Sachs [2000] 
argue that settler mortality is related to the overall disease environment and has a direct 
effect on output. 
 
We bring two innovations to this debate.  First, we have created a new database of 80 
islands which contains a large number of additional data points beyond the usual cross 
section of countries used by growth economists.  Of the 136 countries in the Penn World 
Tables with GDP data for 1989 only 13 are in our database.
2  Islands provide an 
interesting experiment in that our sample has more homogenous initial conditions than 
the Penn World Tables group.  We will also argue that variation in the colonial 
experience of islands was relatively random and therefore constitutes a natural 
experiment. 
 
In order to check this conjecture, we propose and implement a new source of exogenous 
variation in colonial history – wind patterns.  Wind speed and direction were crucial 
during the age of sail, and have useful variation within each ocean and within a given 
latitude.  Islands located near routes in the prevailing winds made useful stopovers and 
were more easily revisited and colonized.  However, since the beginning of the age of 
steam began over 100 years ago, the importance of wind patterns has disappeared.  We 
argue that any effect of wind speed on current GDP works only through wind's effect on 
European settlement. 
 
We show that the length of colonial period is strongly positively related to modern 
outcomes.  In order to asses the randomness of the colonial experience (colonizers may 
settle the best places first and give them up last), we instrument for the year of European 
discovery and subsequent length of colonial period using data on wind patterns.  The IV 
results are nearly identical to the OLS results, which is consistent with our conjecture that 
much of the variation in the colonization of islands is random. 
 
                                                 
2 Barbados, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Mauritius, Philippines, 
Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago, Puerto Rico, Vanuatu 
  3Like Acemoglu et al, our work suggests that differences in European settlement play an 
important role in determining modern output.  However, our initial results differ in that 
the length of time, not the type of settlement is what matters.  It may be that these effects 
are related, so we attempt to distinguish between them by examining some of the colonial 
era institutional features of the islands.  First, we examine the hypothesis that 
colonization raised income via the introduction of trade.  Islands whose primary colonial 
exports involved intensive agriculture or complex extraction fare somewhat better in 
modern times than islands whose main exports were dried coconut or fish.  The trade 
results, however, do not significantly diminish the impact of the length of colonization. 
 
Another institutional feature that is often suggested is democracy.  We look at the first 
date that each island has an elected legislature (including colonial legislatures).  By this 
measure, there is substantial variation in when the various islands obtained democratic 
institutions.  Former Spanish colonies were the slowest to have a democratically elected 
legislature and former British island colonies were the fastest.  However, this measure of 
democratic institutions is not a significant predictor of modern output in our sample.   
 
Next, we use colonial dependence on slave labor and the modern ethnic composition of 
the population as a measure of the type of colonial regime.  Acemoglu et al. find that the 
difference between settlement and extractive colonial regimes is important for explaining 
modern outcomes.  We find no significant difference between colonies with imported 
slaves and those without and we find no relationship between modern ethnic composition 
and output. 
 
We also examine more basic facts about the colonial experience.  La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny [1997, 1998] show that legal origin of the colonizers is 
related to capital market size, with former colonies of English common law countries 
having more developed capital markets than those with French civil law.  We do not find 
a significant difference between colonizers using the two different legal systems.   
 
  4We do, however, find significant differences between colonizers.  An additional year as a 
colony of the US is associated with a significantly larger increase in GDP than any other 
country.  The Dutch, British, and French are next best and there are no significant 
differences between them.  Years as a Spanish colony are still positively associated with 
income, but somewhat less so than the previous group.  Unique among the European 
colonizers, years spent as a Portuguese colony are negatively associated with modern 
GDP.  However, there are only two Portuguese colonies in our dataset and they were all 
very early colonies. 
  
The final difference that we consider is the timing of the colonial period.  The historical 
record suggests that pre-Enlightenment colonialism had a much different attitude toward 
natives than post-Enlightenment colonialism.  The records of the voyage of Magellan in 
the 16
th century versus those of James Cook in the 19
th suggest that the Europeans took 
on a much more benevolent attitude toward native peoples during the latter period.   
Indeed we find that years spent as a colony after 1700 are driving our results.  These 
latter years are significantly associated with modern income while pre 1700 years of 
colonialism have no effect. 
  
The fact that events centuries past exert a modern influence suggests the importance of 
institutions.  Viewed in this way, our results may be most related to Hall and Jones 
[1999], who use geographical instruments to suggest that “social infrastructure,” or 
broadly construed institutions, explain much of modern outcomes.  They find that the 
quality of institutions is a result of European influence.  We advance on their findings in 
several important ways.  First, we can much more cleanly identify the effect of European 
influence through the use of wind as an instrument.  The IV results suggest that the 
colonial experiences of our island sample constitute something of a natural experiment.   
 
Simple institutional features such as trade, democracy, and slavery do not seem to be 
driving our results.  However, differences associated with the identity and timing of the 
colonizers do suggest that there is heterogeneity in the colonial legacy.  Acemoglu et al 
suggest that modern institutional quality is a direct function of the quality of colonial 
  5institutions.  Our results can certainly be viewed through this lens.  Readers of the 
historical record will be unsurprised that we find the US and Dutch to be more beneficial 
colonizers than the Spanish and Portuguese or that 18
th century colonialism is different 
from 16
th century colonialism.  However, this heterogeneity does not diminish the central 
result that a longer experience with Europeans is associated with higher income.
3
 
II.  Islands as Natural Experiments and the Importance of Wind 
II.A.  The Random Component of Island Settlement 
The exploration and settlement of islands in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans 
entails hundreds of fascinating stories and historical accidents.  At the broadest level, the 
pattern of island discovery by Europeans makes a great deal of economic sense.  Most of 
the Caribbean islands were known to Europeans prior to most of the Pacific Islands.  This 
was a matter of distance from Europe and the incredible vastness of the Pacific.  For 
example, Columbus sighted the British Virgin Islands in 1493 and he had already sighted 
portions of the Bahamas, Hispaniola and Cuba a year before that.  Of the 39 Atlantic 
islands in our database, 24 were first sighted by Columbus during one of his three 
voyages.  By 1685 the Dutch were using St. Thomas (Virgin Islands) as a slave trading 
post and the island contained large sugar plantations by the mid 1700s. 
 
Meanwhile, certain islands in the Pacific (in French Polynesia and the Cook Islands in 
particular) were not sighted by Europeans until the late 1700s.  Patterns of settlement 
were determined in part by obvious economic factors like distance to the mainland.   
However, a fair amount of colonization was due to unique historical accidents and due to 
historical trade routes and wind patterns. 
 
The Mutiny on the Bounty itself led to the discovery of several islands and the 
colonization of at least two.  While fleeing Tahiti, the mutineers discovered Rarotonga in 
the Cook Islands.   Captain Bligh discovered Kadavu in Fiji as he sailed his open boat 
3,600 miles from the Friendly Islands to Java (without losing a single one of his 18 
crewmembers).  The mutineers settled on Pitcairn (with their Tahitian wives) precisely 
                                                 
3 Indeed in probably makes the finding more plausible. 
  6because no one lived there and it was not near any land mass of note.  The mutineers' 
descendants became so numerous that the British government then moved some of them 
to Norfolk Island thereby creating a second new colony.   
 
One island in our data set, Penrhyn in the Cook Islands was accidentally colonized in 
1788 when Captain Sever smashed his ship (the Penryhn) into the shoreline on his way to 
deliver convicts to Botany Bay.  Vanuatu acquired a small settlement in 1825 when one 
sailor discovered that it contained sandalwood, which was at that time very valuable.  
Palmerston was colonized by the British mostly because it was empty when Captain 
Cook discovered it.  The first group of settlers took to murdering each other.  However 
the second settlement was more successful; William Marsters moved there in 1862 with 
his three Polynesian wives and his descendants are still there. 
 
II.B.  The Importance of Wind 
Though random accident played a large role, we will also argue that wind speed and 
direction were important factors in the pattern of island colonization.  Unlike powered 
boats, sailboats require steady wind to make headway.  Islands located in areas where the 
wind is weak were less likely to be discovered, revisited, and colonized by Europeans.  
Wind direction is also important.  The technology available at the time of the voyage of 
Columbus only allowed ships to sail about twenty degrees into the wind.  This 
technology improved slowly over time, but sailing into the wind remained difficult until 
steamships became the norm in the twentieth century.
4
  
Consistent downwind routes between useful destinations were therefore well traveled 
while much of the globe went virtually untouched.  Much of the east to west traffic across 
the Pacific after Magellan’s 1521 crossing closely followed his pioneering voyage 
because his path was the logical and efficient way to cross.  Crossing in the opposite 
direction turned out to be much more difficult due to prevailing wind patterns.  At least 
                                                 
4 Sailing ships were common for transoceanic voyages long after the introduction of steam powered ships 
because it was difficult for early steamships to carry enough fuel for long voyages.  This was particularly 
true in the Pacific. 
  7four Spanish expeditions attempted and failed to establish a west to east route across the 
Pacific in the wake of Magellan’s voyage.  It was not until 1565 that a west to east path 
was found across the Pacific and this required sailing much farther north. 
 
The net result of this history is that the pattern of colonization is related to the speed and 
direction of the prevailing winds.  Islands like Fefan and Pohnpei in the Federated States 
of Micronesia have calm winds, were not located near the Spanish trade route and were 
basically left alone, even after their discovery in the 1680s.  At the other extreme, despite 
also being quite isolated, Guam was directly on the Spaniard's Manila Galleon route due 
to a favorable combination of wind and currents.  Magellan found Guam in 1521 and by 
the end of the century it was settled as a watering hole for Spanish ships on the Mexico-
Philippines route. 
 
Once an island was discovered, the path to European settlement was made more difficult 
by the crude state of mapping technology.  Before the mid eighteenth century the 
measurement of longitude at sea was extremely imprecise.  There are many cases of 
islands appearing multiple times on early maps because longitude was estimated 
differently by separate voyages.  Revisiting an island charted by a previous voyage was 
problematic.  The known map of the world at the dawn of the eighteenth century was 
therefore incomplete and inaccurate.  Such was the state of ignorance that many still held 
out hope of a large undiscovered land mass in the Pacific. This changed during the latter 
half of the eighteenth century with the solution of the longitude problem by Harrison.  
James Cook and others made voyages which filled in the remaining map of the Pacific. 
 
Latitude sailing was the most common form of navigation before the solution to the 
latitude problem.  Suppose you were trying to sail from Europe to a particular island in 
the Pacific without an accurate measure of latitude.  You would head north after rounding 
Cape Horn until the vessel was at the same latitude as the destination.  This was easy and 
effective because the ship’s latitude could be easily and accurately determined by 
measuring the height of the sun off the horizon at noon.  Similarly, the latitude of your 
destination on charts was well measured even if the longitude was not.  Once at the 
  8proper latitude, all that was needed to get to the destination was to sail due west until you 
arrived.  In order for this strategy to work, it was important that you arrived at the target 
latitude to the east of your destination, forcing ships to sail north more rapidly than would 
be sensible on a direct route.  With this style of navigation, east-west corridors with 
steady winds become more frequently traveled. 
 
We propose wind speed and direction as ideal instruments for colonization and 
settlement.  Wind was incredibly important during the age of sail, but its importance 
came to an abrupt halt early in the twentieth century.  Thus within our sample wind 
direction and speed should not have a direct effect on an island's current level of GDP, 
but could have an important effect via the island's history of colonization.  In a first stage 
regression, wind speed and variability are important determinants of the number of years 
of colonization. 
 
III. The Nature of Island Colonization 
 
In the Atlantic islands, colonization generally consisted of several hundred or a few 
thousand Europeans arriving and in some cases being granted large parcels of land for 
farming.  Early Spanish colonialism was governed by the encomienda system which 
essentially introduced feudal institutions to the colonies. The conquistadors were given 
trusteeship over the native peoples.  In practice, natives (mostly Arawaks or Caribs) were 
often enslaved to work on these plantations.   
 
Initially the Spanish focused on extracting gold from rivers and showed reckless 
disregard for the natives enslaved to do the work.  At its peak in 1510, Puerto Rico 
produced 100,000 pesos of gold, but gold production gave out completely by 1540 
(Carrión [1973]).  Sugar cane was introduced and soon became a chief export crop in the 
Caribbean islands.  As early as 1550, Puerto Rico had 10 sugar mills producing 500,000 
pounds of sugar a year.  Coffee was introduced in Puerto Rico in 1736 and ginger and 
tobacco were also important crops (Carrión [1973]). 
 
  9The English and French were more enterprising than the Spaniards in setting up the 
sugar-slave economy and by 1673 there were 57 plantations in English controlled 
Barbados.  Jamaica was at one point in the 17
th century (after the British captured it from 
the Spaniards) the world's largest producer of sugar (Black [1881]).  By 1700, the French 
had established many sugar plantations on virtually all of their islands, including 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Grenada, St. Croix, and Saint-Domingue (present day Haiti). 
  
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the island-colonies in the Caribbean 
tended to have several hundred Europeans and, following the introduction of sugar were 
often outnumbered by African slaves by a factor of 10 to 1.  In 1530 Puerto Rico had 
about 400 Spaniards and 2200 African slaves (Wagenheim [1973]).  By 1789 Saint-
Domingue was home to 40,000 whites and 455,000 black slaves.    
 
Colonies in the Pacific Islands tended to involve fewer numbers of Europeans and far less 
reliance on imported slaves.  Missionaries were often the first colonial residents.  For 
example, Guam was first sighted by Magellan in 1521.  In 1668 the Spanish installed a 
group of Jesuit missionaries, a single garrison of soldiers and a colonial governor.  The 
Spanish mission totaled 50 people relative to the 12,000 Chamorros on Guam.  (Douglas 
[1994], Rogers [1995]).   
 
European contact with and colonization of Tahiti was relatively late in coming.  Wallis 
landed there and traded with the natives in 1767.  Cook did the same two years later and 
then Bligh visited several times and stayed for several months.  British missionaries 
eventually showed up around 1797.  The mission consisted initially of 18 men and 5 
women and these Europeans settled on the Matavai Bay peninsula.  British ships 
continued to stop in Tahiti with increasing frequency to take on water and food.  By the 
census in 1848 there were about 500 white people in Tahiti (Newbury [1980]).  
 
French missionaries arrived in New Caledonia in 1843.  By 1878, the French had 
established a penal colony there with 6,000 white prisoners and several hundred free 
whites including soldiers (Lyons [1986]).  Spain's colonization of the Caroline and 
  10Marshall Islands was extremely sparse.  In 1710 two Jesuit missionaries were landed at 
Palau but were never seen or heard from again.  The Spanish placed a handful of 
Capuchin monks on Yap who opened a school and managed to convert a large number of 
natives.   
 
In the late nineteenth century entrepreneurial traders and employees of trading companies 
were also responsible for a modest presence of Europeans and Americans on some 
Pacific Islands.  O'Keefe was an Irish-American from Georgia who ran a series of trading 
outposts and stores on Yap and Palau (Hezel [1995]).  James Paddon, a sandalwood 
merchant, was one of the first white settlers in New Caledonia.   In 1851, he moved his 
trading and shipping business to the area that became the town of Noumea.  
 
IV. The Impact of Colonization 
IV.A.  Loss of Native Peoples to Disease and Slavery 
 
One of the most striking and terrible facts about colonization by Europeans is the degree 
to which native populations on some islands were decimated either by brutal enslavement 
or by diseases carried by Europeans and their animals (See Diamond [1997]).  This is 
most true in the Atlantic where certain islands lost their entire native population in a short 
amount of time.  For example, the Spaniards began to colonize Puerto Rico in 1505 under 
the leadership of Ponce de Leon.  The native Tainos were essentially enslaved as part of 
the encomienda system in which land grants to Spaniards included the right to extract 
tribute or labor from the natives assigned to that land.  The original population of Tainos 
was estimated to have been 60,000.  By 1515 this had fallen to 14,400 and by 1530 to 
1,500 (Wagenheim [1998]).   Prior to the arrival of Europeans, Jamaica was heavily 
settled and was home to tens of thousands of Arawaks.  Not a single one of the natives 
were alive by the time the British took over from the Spanish in 1655 (Black [1881]).     
 
The Pacific islanders also faced shocking mortality due to smallpox and other diseases 
brought by the Europeans.
5  However, only a few of the islands saw a complete wiping 
                                                 
5 Venereal disease brought by the Spaniards often lead to sterilization. 
  11out of the original inhabitants and several islands fared reasonably well.  Perhaps the 
worst depopulation occurred in Guam and the Marianas.  The number of pure blooded 
Chamorros on Guam fell from 12,000 in 1668 to 1,576 in 1742
6.  By this point the 
Chamorros were well intermarried with Filipino and Spanish immigrant families.   
 
The Tahitians saw a drop in their population as a result of the introduction of European 
disease, but this was followed by a partial recovery.    One estimate puts the population of 
Tahiti at 24,000 around the time of Cook's visit but only 9,000-10,000 by 1800.  The 
native population stabilized and remained around 9,500 at the time of the 1848 census.  
There was a discrete drop in the 1850s (an epidemic?) but population not only recovered 
to the 1848 level but grew modestly for the next 60 years (Newbury [1980]). 
 
Any discussion of the effects of colonialism on economic output has to acknowledge the 
devastation of native populations and cultures.  Our results show that islands with a 
longer colonial history (and more settlement by Europeans) have higher income per 
capita and lower infant mortality than other similar islands.  Is it sensible to measure the 
positive effects on growth from European contact if in fact the original inhabitants are 
partially or entirely wiped out because of that contact?  Is the possibility of no European 
contact a realistic counterfactual?  Even without colonialism proper, any contact still may 
have wiped out entire populations. 
 
We do not intend to address these questions in this paper.  Our results are simply an 
examination of the standard of living of people currently alive on these islands relative to 
the colonial experience.  We do, however, recognize that there are other measures of the 
outcomes from colonialism that may generate different conclusions.  It is certainly 
plausible to argue that the accumulated utility of Pacific Islanders since first encountering 
Europeans is lower than in the counterfactual even if the current standard of living on 
these islands is significantly higher because of that contact. 
 
                                                 
6 Douglas [1995] notes that the population decline probably started much earlier, i.e. in 1564 when 
Legazpi's expedition visited the Marianas and likely introduced European diseases. 
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If colonial tenure is related to modern economic outcomes, the obvious question is why?  
Our results and our reading of the historical record suggest a very sensible yet under-
discussed explanation: the promotion of trade.  For many of the islands the very notion of 
households generating a surplus and exporting this surplus in exchange for money and 
goods arrived with the colonizers.  The historical record makes it clear that colonial 
governments were obsessed with introducing and expanding the production of export 
commodities like sugar, coffee, tobacco, and even coconuts.  Colonial island regimes 
were obsessed with "making the colony profitable" or at least self sustaining.  Home 
governments wanted to collect more tax revenue than they were pouring into the island as 
subsidies. Colonial governors wanted to generate lots of cash flow from exports so that 
they could direct some of this cash into their pockets. 
 
By 1510, Spain was closely monitoring production in Puerto Rico and the Crown 
appointed an accountant, a commissioner and a treasurer to measure production and 
exports and collect the appropriate duties on the King's behalf.  When opportunities for 
extracting gold and salt ran out in 1530, Puerto Rico's Governor, Franciso Manuel de 
Lando seized on the idea of growing sugar for export.  He convinced the Crown to 
provide loans to build sugar mills and to finance the voyage of families from Spain and 
refugees from Brazil to provide labor.  Prospective plantation owners were lured from 
Spain with the promise of the indefinite use of large (several hundred acre) tracts of land 
for growing sugar (Wagenheim, p 56-57). 
 
The Spanish colonists in Jamaica experimented with a wide variety of export crops 
including tobacco, indigo, and cocoa before they hit upon sugar as the real cash crop.  
Once the British seized Jamaica, Governor Sir Thomas Modyford (1664) immediately set 
about both increasing the amount of land under sugar cultivation and encouraging large 
scale plantation agriculture (Black [1881], pp. 89-90). 
 
  13European colonists in the Pacific Islands also focused on trade and exports.  New 
Caledonia settlers in the 1860s initially tried growing coffee, sugar, tobacco and rice.  But 
cattle proved the ideal product and there were more than 100,000 cattle there by 1890!  
However, the real export legacy of colonists in New Caledonia came in 1864 when 
Garnier discovered nickel (Lyons [1986], p. 49).  New Caledonia is currently the world's 
fourth largest nickel producer and has about 25 percent of proven reserves.
7   Even very 
lightly settled islands of the Pacific were affected by international trade introduced by the 
Europeans.  Copra (dried coconut) became a chief export of Yap by the 1880s and natives 
would haul baskets of coconuts to local trading stations. (Hezel [1995], p 19.). 
  
IV.C.  Building of Schools, Roads and Public Health Infrastructure by Colonizers 
 
Besides the promotion of trade, colonizers also had a large hand in building schools, 
roads and infrastructure for drinking water.  In the early colonial period, island schools 
were introduced and run by missionaries and were neither comprehensive (generally 
being grammar schools only) nor universal.  San Juan, Puerto Rico had one school built 
by the Franciscans in 1640 and a second shortly thereafter by the local Bishop. 
(Wagenheim [1998], p. 74).  San Juan's first high school was established in 1832 by a 
group of clergymen.  By 1897 Puerto Rico had 551 schools and 28,000 pupils.   
(Wagenheim, p. 234-235.)   Many early public schools in Jamaica were set up by 
bequests from plantation owners who wanted to benefit the island residents.  The first 
such school opened in 1694 using a bequest from Raines Waite (Black [1881], p. 187).  
The first school on Guam was opened in 1873 by the missionary Father San Vitores 
(Rogers [1995], p. 50).    Several schools on Tahiti were opened by missionaries in the 
late 1800s and the colonial government opened a school for teachers in 1901 (Newbury 
[1980], p. 150). 
 
Universal education did not arrive in any of the island colonies until the twentieth 
century, but in many cases colonizers had a hand in setting up universal educational 
systems.  After Puerto Rico became a US commonwealth, the American administration 
                                                 
7 CIA World Factbook, minerals.usgs.gov 
  14rapidly expanded the number of rural schools.  By 1920 there were 11 high schools and 
the University of Puerto Rico had been founded (Carrión [1983], p. 174). 
 
IV.D.  Does the Enlightenment Matter? -- Magellan versus Cook 
 
The previous sections suggest several concrete institutional differences that may be 
associated with the colonial legacy.  In this section we would like to suggest a more basic 
difference in the nature of colonial regimes -- timing.  There was a distinct change in the 
attitude of the explorers toward the world between the beginning of the period of 
exploration and the final filling in of the maps of the world.  To illustrate this, one need 
only look at the differences in motivation between Ferdinand Magellan and James Cook. 
 
When Magellan set sail on his famous circumnavigation in 1519 his goal was to find a 
Spanish route to the Spice Islands.  The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 split the world 
between Spain and Portugal at 46°W longitude.  It was also agreed that this line extended 
completely around the globe.  However, due to the inability to measure longitude 
accurately, the exact location of this antemeridian was uncertain.  The Spanish felt that a 
westward route would allow them to lay claims on the Spice Islands.  The agreement 
between Spain and Portugal had the blessing of the Pope and along with their rights to 
these unfound lands came a responsibility to spread Christianity.  Magellan’s voyage was 
therefore explicitly commercial with religious overtones. 
 
This stands in stark contrast to the voyages of James Cook between 1768 and 1779.  
Cook’s missions had explicit scientific aims.  The first voyage was commissioned by the 
Royal Society to observe the transit of Venus across the sun from Tahiti.  The second 
voyage’s goal was to find the Terra Australis, the mythical southern continent.  The third 
voyage was in search of the Northwest Passage.  On all three voyages, Cook brought 
artists and scientists to record and study all that he found.  Since the longitude problem 
had been solved, Cook was able to accurately fill in the map of the Pacific.  His 
“discoveries” point out how weak European knowledge of the Pacific was at this late 
date.  Many islands were first charted by Cook and his ships made the first European 
  15circumnavigation of New Zealand.  He also claimed the east coast of Australia for 
Britain. 
 
Unlike Magellan, who was driven to bring Christianity to the natives, Cook had a much 
more romantic view of the Pacific islanders. 
“We debauch their morals already too prone to vice and we introduce 
among them wants and perhaps diseases which they never before knew 
and which serves only to disturb that happy tranquility they and their 
forefathers have enjoyed … If anyone denies the truth of this assertion let 
him tell me what the natives of the whole extent of America have gained 
by the commerce they have had with Europeans.”
8
 
Clearly this suggests that islands found and colonized later had a much different 
experience than those found during the initial period. 
 
V.  Data Description 
 
The data on island colonization, GDP, and infant mortality are assembled from a large 
number of sources.  Our starting point was a database of islands maintained by the UN.
9  
This dataset provided us with a comprehensive list of individual islands along with 
nation, population and area.  We sorted the islands by population and investigated islands 
that satisfied two criteria.  First, we only included islands that require open ocean sailing 
to reach them from Europe.  Second, we limited the sample to relatively small 
landmasses, specifically those less than 150,000 square kilometers.  These selection 
criteria are intended to generate a sample of islands that fit our story of random variation 
in colonial experience.  We are particularly interested in the randomness associated with 
the age of exploration.  Islands that were unavoidably found as Europeans made their 
way down the coast of Africa clearly have a less random history than the islands of the 
Pacific.  The size criterion is intended to make the sample as homogeneous as possible.  
Large landmasses like Australia are fundamentally different than the islands in our 
sample.  Within the group of islands fitting these criteria we researched islands in order 
of population using any islands for which data were available.  
                                                 
8 Hough [1994]. 
9 http://islands.unep.ch/ 
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Islands that are part of a group are only included as independent data points if there is 
some independent information for the individual island.  For example, the majority of the 
islands in the Maldives have an identical colonial history and we only have one GDP data 
point for the entire group.  In this case, there is only one island in the Maldives included 
in our dataset.  On the other hand, the islands of the Netherlands Antilles have 
heterogeneity of both colonial history and GDP, so the individual islands in the group are 
included separately.  We do, however, recognize that these may not be completely 
independent data points so all the econometric analysis is clustered at the islands group 
level.   
 
Where available, we obtained GDP per capita for the year 2000 from the United Nations.  
Per capita GDP figures were available for 39 island nations covering 61 of the islands in 
our dataset.  Roughly 19 islands are possessions of other countries, for example Guam is 
a US possession.  In those cases we obtained island level income per capita and infant 
mortality numbers for the island from the statistical agency of the relevant country.
10  In 
the case of islands that are currently part of an island group (such as the Cook Islands), 
we disaggregated country level data into the component islands where possible.   For 
example Yap and Pohnpei are both states in the Federated States of Micronesia, but the 
two islands have different histories, wind patterns, and economic output and are located 
more than 1,000 miles apart.  In some of these cases we were able to obtain separate GDP 




The colonial and settlement histories for each island come from a myriad of sources.  For 
the Pacific islands we relied heavily in the Pacific Island Yearbook.  For Atlantic and 
Indian Ocean islands, we used Encyclopedia Britannica and supplemented this source 
                                                 
10 In these cases we will be using income per capita as a proxy for GDP per capita.  We recognize that this 
is an imperfect measure.  We report robustness checks where we limit ourselves to the GDP data. 
11 We used the breakdowns by island in the following way.  The island group level data was used to 
establish relative income levels.  For example, the disaggregated data tells us that Yap in the FSM has 
twice the per capita income of Moen in the same group.  Using the relative income and population data we 
calculated the per capita income for each island so that the relative income levels were correct and  that the 
population weighted group average was equal to the GDP per capita figure for the group from the UN. 
  17with information from official websites maintained by the governments of each island.  
We collected the entire history of each island, including the first European sightings, the 
first settlements, the extent of such settlements, and the political history of the island's 
colonization if any. 
 
Wind speeds are from satellite data taken from CERSTAT.
12  The satellites measure 
wind speeds over water for the entire globe, reported on a one degree longitude latitude 
grid.  The data we utilize are reported monthly and consist of the average wind vector in 
the north-south direction and the average wind vector in the east-west direction.  For our 
instruments, we use the average and standard deviation of these data points over the year. 
 
Table I contains summary statistics for the data.  Thirty nine of the eighty islands are 
located in the Pacific, thirty five are in the Atlantic and the remainder are in the Indian 
Ocean.  The median population on our islands is about 14,000 people. This ranges from 
as few as 102 people on Palmerston Island (in the Cook Islands) to more than 11 million 
people in Cuba.  Our results are robust to dropping islands with fewer than 10,000 
people.  The median land area for the islands is 130 square kilometers.  The mean 2000 
GDP per capita on the islands in the sample is $7,953 with a high of $53,735 for 
Bermuda. 
 
All but one of the islands, Tonga, was a European colony at some point in their history 
with an average number of years as a colony of over 218 years.  However there is a larger 
group that had relatively limited colonial experience.  Twenty four countries in the 
sample were a colony for one hundred years or less and fourteen for less than fifteen 
years.  In general the Atlantic islands were the first to be colonized by Europeans and 
some islands including Bonaire, Curacao, and Barbados have 400 years of colonial 
history. 
 
                                                 
12 The CERSAT  (Centre ERS d'Archivage et de Traitement - French ERS Processing and Archiving 
Facility) is part of IFREMER (French Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea. It was created in 1991 
as a node of the ESA  (European Space Agency) ground segment for the ERS-1 and ERS-2 Earth 
observation satellites.  http://www.ifremer.fr/cersat/ 
  18One possible criticism of our approach is that islands tend to be small and have different 
natural resources than continental nations and are therefore not "real countries" of interest 
to macroeconomists.  Since many successful islands focus on tourism, one could also 
make the case that this also makes them different from "real" countries.  We have several 
responses to this.  First, the islands in the sample have rich variation in their latitudes and 
levels and types of natural resources.  Appendix Table IV shows that agriculture is a large 
fraction of the economy for islands like Dominica and some of the Federated States of 
Micronesia like Pohnpei.   Bermuda and the Virgin Islands tend to focus on services, 
though this can mean banking and insurance in addition to tourism.  More importantly, 
even if all the islands in the South Pacific or the Atlantic had beautiful beaches, we still 
would need to ask why certain islands have a subsistence level of income while others 
have a standard of living that rivals Sweden and the US.  Grand Cayman is a tourist 
paradise while Hispaniola (Haiti plus the Dominican Republic) is not, despite the fact that 
both islands have tropical breezes and the beauty of the Caribbean Sea.
13
 
VI. Empirical Results 
 
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of log GDP per capita versus number of centuries as a 
colony.  The circles are for islands in the Atlantic. The triangles are for islands in the 
Pacific and the squares are for islands in the Indian Ocean.  The regression line shows a 
clear positive relationship between length of colonial period and modern GDP.  While 
there is a large amount of variation around the regression line (we certainly don't think 
colonial history explains everything), the t-statistic for the slope is 6.1.  The coefficient is 
0.41 meaning that every additional 100 years of colonial history is associated with a 41 
percent increase in GDP.  Remarkably the upward slope holds within each of the oceans.  
The relationship is not driven simply by the fact that Atlantic islands were discovered by 
Europeans earliest and are the richest. 
 
                                                 
13We are not claiming that the length of the colonial period explains the Grand Cayman  Hispaniola income 
gap but rather that even within Caribbean islands, there is massive and interesting variation in economic 
performance. 
  19Table II shows five different cross sectional regressions with our basic result.  For 
columns (1) through (5) log GDP per capita is the dependent variable.  Column (1) shows 
the basic correlation illustrated in Figure (1).   Higher per capita GDP is associated with a 
longer period under colonial rule.  Each additional hundred years is associated with GDP 
per capita that is 41 percent higher.   
 
Column (2) adds geographic controls.  We include dummies for each ocean and we 
control for island land area and absolute value of latitude (distance from the Equator).  As 
in Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger [1999] and Sachs [2003], the absolute value of latitude is 
strongly related to current levels of income.  Every 10 degree increase in latitude (i.e. 
moving roughly 700 miles away from the equator) is associated with a 48 percent 
increase in GDP.  Those authors find that latitude works through the efficiency of 
agriculture and disease prevalence.  Acemoglu et al [2001] provide evidence that 
latitude's effects work through variation in the nature of European settlements and 
institutions that were established.  Island area is also significant with larger islands doing 
more poorly than smaller islands.  Interestingly, the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean dummies 
are not significantly different from each other, though the Pacific coefficient is 
significantly different from the Indian Ocean (the excluded category).  Including the 
geographic controls does not substantially alter the results for colonial tenure. 
 
One important possibility is that Europeans simply chose to settle the best islands first 
and hence the more successful islands have a longer colonial history.  For example, being 
near a continent could be correlated both with heavy settlement and with current GDP.  
We are able to reject this explanation for our results by using wind direction and speed as 
instruments for settlement or length of colonial period.  As discussed in a previous 
section, wind patterns make an appealing instrument because they were incredibly 
important during 1500-1890 (and determined discovery and settlement), but may have 
little direct effect on GDP today. 
 
In column (3) we instrument for the number of years as a colony using data on wind 
speed.  Given the direction of travel from Europe, the east-west component of the wind is 
  20particularly important for sailing voyages.  We use the average value for the east-west 
component of the wind and the monthly standard deviation as instruments.
14  Column (1) 
in Appendix I shows the first stage.  The instruments are significant predictors of the 
length of colonial history with a first stage F statistic of 6.0.  Each individual instrument 
is significant.  Column (3) of Table I shows the second stage of the two stage least 
squares regression.  The results are statistically indistinguishable from the OLS results 
and the coefficient on years of colonization remains very significantly away from zero 
with a t-statistic of 2.8.  Each additional hundred years of colonization is associated with 
44 percent larger GDP per capita. 
 
One objection to our IV strategy is that the instrument is well suited to describing the 
beginning of colonial rule, but is not a good instrument for the end of colonial rule.  
Given that the years of colonial rule is determined by both the beginning and end dates of 
the colonial period, it seems sensible to examine these separately.    A final concern about 
late colonialism is that our data includes countries which currently have a colonial 
relationship with a developed country such as Puerto Rico, Guam, or the Netherlands 




Columns (4) and (5) present regressions which use the first and last year of colonialism 
instead of the total number of years of colonialism.
16  These regressions also include a 
dummy to indicate if the country was a colony after 2000. The results indicate that it is 
the start date of colonialism that is driving our results, not the end date.  The coefficient 
on the beginning year of colonialism is identical in magnitude (but opposite in sign) to 
the coefficient on the number of years of colonialism in the previous regressions.  Being 
colonized one hundred years later is associated with a 40% increase in income.  The 
coefficient on the last year of colonialism is well estimated to be near zero.  Whether the 
                                                 
14Appendix II explores the use of other variations on wind speed and direction as instruments.  The results 
are quite similar. 
15It is not clear that we should be excluding late transfers as part of the colonial legacy.  If one aspect of 
having been a colony in 1800 is that you increase the probability of being a colony in 2000 this should be 
included as part of the effect of colonialism. 
16 These data are divided by 100 in order to have the coefficients consistent with centuries as a colony. 
  21island was still a colony in 2000, however, is significant and positive.  Being a colony in 
2000 is associated with 40% higher income.  The inclusion of this dummy has no 
significant impact on the coefficient on the first or last year of colonialism, suggesting 
that our base result is not being driven by current transfers.  In Column (5) the first year 
of colonialism is instrumented with wind.  The results are statistically identical to the 
OLS results. 
 
As an additional outcome measure we replace GDP per capital with infant mortality in 
Columns (6) – (8).  These results mirror the results for GDP per capita.  The number of 
centuries that an island was a colony is a negative and significant predictor of infant 
mortality in all the specifications.  One notable difference compared to the GDP columns 
is the importance of the ocean dummies.  The Indian Ocean has significantly higher 
infant mortality than the Pacific.  This result is also robust to our IV strategy. 
 
The regressions in Table III examine whether our results are being driven by sample and 
data selection.  Column (1) repeats our base result.  Column (2) excludes islands for 
which there is no direct GDP data available from the UN.  These excluded islands are 
generally territories of developed countries such Guam and the British Virgin Islands.  
This column does allow for adjustments to GDP within island groups as described in the 
data section.  Column (3) does not include these adjustments.  The results for these three 
columns are identical, suggesting that our data collection is not driving the results. 
 
Columns (4) through (7) show the results of running our base regression on sub samples 
of islands limited to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  Columns (4) and (5)  are estimated 
with OLS.  Columns (6) and (7) instrument the number of centuries of colonialism with 
wind data as described above.  Remarkably, the results are the same for each ocean as 
they are for the entire sample and in all cases the coefficient on the number of years of 
colonialism is statistically significant. 
 
 
  22VI.A.  Mechanisms 
 
The island data show a robust relationship between the length of colonization and modern 
day income.  The next question is of course, why should past colonialism in these islands 
be good for income levels?
17  Any explanation must allow for events happening centuries 
ago to matter today.  This fact alone points to the importance of institutions, given their 
longevity.  For example the establishment of property rights, courts and a stable 
government are all likely to be helpful for long run economic performance.  Another 
related possibility is that the Europeans (particularly the missionaries who established 
many of the earliest settlements) established schools which raised human capital.  The 
colonized islands may have been more able to trade with other islands and other countries 
following colonization. 
 
This line of thought is hardly new.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that certain 
forms of European settlement set up stable, pro-growth institutions.  In particular, they 
distinguish between the types of colony, with settlement colonies producing positive 
modern outcomes and extractive colonies producing negative ones.  La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny [1997, 1998] also emphasize an aspect of the quality of 
colonization, finding that the identity of the colonizer matters through differences in the 
legal systems.  Our initial results emphasize the importance of the quantity of European 
influence, without reference to the specifics of the colonial regime.  This section will ask 
whether controlling for mechanisms through which colonization may matter diminishes 
the importance of the length of the colonial experience. 
 
Table IV examines whether any measures of the quality of the colonial experience can 
diminish the importance of the length of colonial experience.  Columns (1) and (2) look 
at the impact of trade, slavery and democracy.  We include in our basic regression a 
dummy for whether the island engaged in trade in complex products during the colonial 
period.  The dummy variable is positive for islands which only traded in gathered 
products such as fish or dried coconut during the colonial period.  Islands trading in 
                                                 
17 We can't come close to answering this question, but we mention here some of the most plausible reasons 
discussed in the literature. 
  23organized agriculture (such as sugar), mining, or livestock are coded with a zero.  We 
include a dummy for whether agriculture used imported slaves.  We also check the 
possibility that the length of colonization is associated with greater democratization.  We 
test this by including the year of the first elected legislature as a regressor.  Column (3) 
uses dummies for 19
th and 18
th century legislatures to check for nonlinearity in this effect. 
 
The point estimates suggest that islands with major trade goods in colonial times have 
higher modern output by 40-50%.  This result is generally statistically insignificant.  The 
inclusion of trade does not diminish the importance of the length of colonization, 
suggesting that something other than the trade channel is at work.  The use of imported 
slaves is not significantly correlated with income and the point estimate is quite close to 
zero.  Similarly, an early legislature does not appear to be correlated with income.   
Neither of these controls changes the basic result. 
 
Another potential (and insidious) possibility is that the colonizers of the earlier settled 
islands wiped out the native population and replaced it with Europeans with higher 
human capital or more ability to trade.  We partially reject this explanation based on the 
fact that most of the Pacific Islands in our sample still have much of their native 
population intact.  For example, on Guam, one of the most economically successful 
Pacific islands, 43 percent of the people can trace their roots back to the original 
Chamorros who inhabited the island and 22 percent of the people are Filipino.  In Tahiti, 
67 percent of the people are Polynesian and another 17 percent are part Polynesian.  Only 
10 percent are white. 
 
More formally, we test to see whether the modern ethnic composition of the islands 
explains differences in output.  This ties in nicely with Acemoglu et al, whose work 
suggests that higher rates of long run settlement are associated with better institutions. 
Column (4) of Table IV tests the effect of modern ethnic composition on output along 
with the length of colonial experience.  We find that the modern ethnic composition is 
significantly correlated with output.  The omitted category is Asian and natives, so higher 
numbers of blacks, whites or mixed race are correlated with higher income.  This is 
  24consistent with the notion that more European influence, in this case in the form of 
population transfers, leads to higher income.  As in Acemoglu et al, settlement colonies 
appear to do better.  The results do not, however, support obvious conclusions about the 
quality of European influence.  The coefficient on percentage white is not significantly 
different than the coefficient on percentage black.  
 
VI.B.  The Identity of the Colonizer and the Timing of the Colonial Experience 
 
Tables V and VI investigate differences in the quality of colonial experience in a much 
more basic level.  Two different hypotheses are examined.  First, does the identity of the 
colonizer matter?  Are years under French significantly different than years under 
Spanish rule?  Second, does the timing of colonialism matter?  Is there a difference 
between years spent as a colony in the 16
th century versus the 18
th century? 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table V ask whether the nation doing the colonizing is related to 
modern day GDP per capita.  Years spent as a colony are included in the regression 
individually.  Given the number of regressors, the individual coefficients are surprisingly 
well estimated and some conclusions about a ranking of colonizing countries can be 
made.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, a year spent as a US colony is associated with a larger 
income increase than a year spent under any other country.  The difference between the 
US and the other countries is significant.  The Dutch, British and French comprise the 
second best group and are statistically identical.  The Spanish are next with a coefficient 
that is significantly lower than the Dutch, but not the British and French.   
 
The Portuguese are significantly worse than all the others.  They are the only country that 
shows a significant negative effect of an additional year of colonialism.  It should be 
noted however that this results rests on a base of only two islands (St. Helena in the 
Atlantic and Huvadu in the Maldives) and that the Portuguese experience was limited to 
the 17
th century and earlier.  As we will show shortly, years of early colonialism are not 
necessarily identical to years of later colonialism. 
 
  25The fact that there is no evidence that the British islands are outperforming the French 
islands is interesting in light of work by LaPorta et al [1996] that show significant 
differences in performance related to British and French legal systems.  The French and 
the British are not, however, the only countries to adopt these legal systems.  For column 
(2) we group the years of colonization by the legal system of the colonizers.  The US and 
Britain use the British Common law legal system.  The Dutch, French, Spanish, and 
Portuguese use the French Civil law legal system  For completeness (and to be consistent 
with LaPorta et al) we include a category for Japanese and German colonies using the 
German legal system.  We find that there is no significant difference between the three 
systems. 
 
Table VI examines the question of Magellan versus Cook raised earlier in the paper.  Are 
differences in pre and post enlightenment colonialism evident in our data? Column (1) 
splits the number of years of colonialism into years before 1700 and years after 1700.
18  
The results suggest that only the years after 1700 are positively associated with modern 
outcomes.  An additional 100 years of post-1700 colonialism is associated with 64% 
higher per capita income.  The coefficient is highly significant and significantly different 
than the coefficient on pre-1700 colonial years.  This suggests that the colonial era of 
Cook was indeed different from that of Columbus and Magellan.  
 
Column (2) breaks the years into three eras, pre-enlightenment, post-enlightenment, and 
post 1900.  Once again, the pre and post enlightenment years are significantly different 
from each other.  The 20
th century years are not significantly different from either era.  In 
column (3) we add a dummy for whether an island was a colony in 2000 in order to 
isolate the effect of transfers from other mechanisms.  With this additional control, years 
of 20
th century colonialism become statistically worse than years between 1700 and 1900.  
Being a colony at the end of the 20
th century remains positively associated with income.  
This result suggests that decolonization during the 20
th century was problematic.   
Colonies that made it to the end of the century are much better off than countries that did 
not.  Interestingly, the net result of being a colony for the entire 20
th century is not 
                                                 
18The results are robust to moving the cutoff to 1750. 
  26significantly different than zero.  Obviously, conclusions involving decolonization do not 
fit our natural experiment story since the end of colonialism is almost certainly 
endogenous.  This result must therefore be seen as more of an interesting correlation than 
causal. 
 
VI.C.  A Broader Sample of Countries 
 
Our results suggest that the length of colonial experience is positively correlated with per 
capital GDP in a sample of islands.  The IV results further suggest that these results are 
not being driven by the selective colonization of islands that have features conducive to 
good modern outcomes.  Given the similarity of the IV and OLS results, it may be 
instructive to check the basic results against a larger more traditional sample of countries.  
Table IV shows the results from regressing per capita GDP against the number of years a 
country was a colony for a sample of non-island developing countries.  This sample is 
consistent with the countries included in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson.   
 
The basic results match quite nicely with our island results.  Each additional century of 
colonial tenure is associated with a 40 percent increase in GDP.  This is not statistically 
significantly different from the 45 percent coefficient found in the island sample.   
Including latitude as a control does not significantly change this coefficient.  One 
advantage of using this sample is that standard measures of modern institutional quality 
can be included.  Column (3) of Table IV includes expropriation risk as an additional 
regressor.  Expropriation risk is significant and negative, as expected.  This reduces the 
point estimate on colonial tenure, but it remains large and significant.  In column (4) we 
include the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson measure of log settler mortality with 
similar results.  
 
While the results from this sample are not as well identified as from the islands sample, 
they are still instructive.  The basic relationship appears to extend beyond our island 
sample.  The results are robust to the inclusion of standard modern institutional measures 
and geographic controls.  
  27 
VII.  Concluding Remarks 
 
We have argued for an "islands as experiments" approach where random variation in the 
colonial experiences of islands can be used to think about the long run effects of colonial 
history on economic performance.   The most interesting fact in our sample is a robust 
positive relationship between the years of European colonialism and current levels of 
income.  While some of this relationship could be driven by smart selection of islands by 
colonizers, we suspect that part of the relationship is causal.  When we instrument for 
colonization and settlement using wind patterns, we obtain coefficients on years of 
colonization that are identical to our OLS results. 
  
While the basic results suggest that longer European colonial exposure is good for the 
modern inhabitants of the islands in our sample, there are a few interesting caveats that 
we can introduce.  First, there is a discernable pecking order amongst the colonizers.  
Years under US and Dutch colonial rule are significantly better than years under the 
Spanish and Portuguese.   
 
Second, later years of colonialism are associated with a much larger increase in modern 
GDP than years before 1700.  These findings are consistent with the Acemoglu et al. 
result that the quality of the colonial experience is important for modern outcomes.  It is 
not difficult to believe that colonialism in the post-enlightenment era led to more efficient 
and beneficial institution transfer than colonialism under the encomienda system and its 
contemporaries.  This is not to say that we find the early colonial years to be detrimental 
to modern GDP – we do not.  However, given the human toll on the early natives, it is not 
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  32Table I 
Summary Statistics 
 
These are summary statistics for the variables in the islands database.  See the text for details on variable 




Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Island's GDP per Capita 2000  80  7,953.38 8,909.50  264.00 53,735.00 
Log (GDP Capita)  80 8.42  1.12 5.57  10.89 
Infant Mortality 2002  80 18.68  15.21  4.00  79.00 
Number of Centuries as a Colony  80 2.18  1.54 0.00  5.11 
Northerly Vector of Prevailing Wind  80 0.18  1.28  -1.55  4.20 
Easterly Vector of Prevailing Wind  80 -4.20  2.02 -6.88  4.42 
No Historical (1500-1820) Off Island 
Trade Except Fish or Coconuts (0-1)  80 0.48  0.50 0.00  1.00 
Agriculture Used Imported Slaves  80 0.40  0.49 0.00  1.00 
Year of First Elected Legislature  80 1939  69 1639  2004 
Had Legislature by 1800  80 0.08  0.27 0.00  1.00 
Had Legislature by 1900  80 0.14  0.35 0.00  1.00 
Percent Current Pop Native  77 49.07  45.06  0.00  100.00 
Percent Current Pop White  77 7.86  16.06 0.00  95.88 
Percent Current Pop Black  77 23.65  36.98  0.00  95.00 
Percent Current Pop Mixed  77 12.60  24.05  0.00  93.20 
Number of Centuries British  80 0.86  1.23 0.00  3.95 
Number of Centuries French  80 0.40  0.82 0.00  3.69 
Number of Centuries Spanish  80 0.38  0.95 0.00  4.05 
Ever British  80 0.68  0.47 0.00  1.00 
Ever French  80 0.31  0.47 0.00  1.00 
Ever Spanish  80 0.25  0.44 0.00  1.00 
Absolute Value of Latitude  80 15.66  7.71  0.50  51.92 
Island Area (1000s sq km)  80 5.92  20.5  0.003  110.0 
Island Population  70 302,720  1,394,832  102  11,000,000 
Island is in Pacific  80 0.49  0.50 0.00  1.00 
Island is in Atlantic  80 0.44  0.50 0.00  1.00 
Island is in Indian  80 0.07  0.27 0.00  1.00 
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Table II 
Outcomes Regressed on Years of Colonization 
 
We regress Log GDP per capita and infant mortality on the number of years the island spent as a colony of 
a European power.  Columns (1), (2), (4), (6) and (7) are OLS.  Columns (3), (5)  and (8) are two stage least 
squares where we instrument for centuries of colonial rule or the first year as a colony using the 12 month 
average and standard deviation of the east-west wind speed for each island. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 





















Per 1000 - 
IV 
Number of  Centuries a Colony   0.413  0.450  0.441      -2.801  -2.611  -10.244 
 (0.065)**  (0.083)**  (0.157)**      (1.156)* (1.259)* (4.344)* 
First Year a Colony        -0.396  -0.545       
      (0.101)**  (0.232)*      
Final Year A Colony        0.014  0.007       
      (0.014)  (0.017)      
Remained A Colony in 2000        0.800  0.732       
      (0.149)**  (0.206)**      
Abs(Latitude)   0.048 0.048 0.039 0.042   -0.763 -0.771 
   (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.013)**   (0.211)** (0.221)** 
Area in millions  of sq km    -21.046  -20.984  -20.429  -23.791    263.524  321.185 
   (3.937)** (3.961)** (4.707)** (6.169)**   (149.986)+ (143.722)* 
Island is in Pacific     0.779  0.767  0.747  0.944    -7.427  -18.724 
    (0.457)+ (0.522) (0.470) (0.569)    (9.498) (13.608) 
Island is in Atlantic     0.615  0.622  0.427  0.298    -7.349  -1.117 
   (0.400) (0.410) (0.367) (0.403)    (8.581)  (8.555) 
Constant  7.524  6.172  6.192 13.673 16.356 24.771  41.579  60.751 
  (0.166)** (0.526)** (0.659)** (1.942)** (4.173)** (3.677)** (10.898)** (18.551)** 
Observations  80 80 80 80 80 80  80  80 
R-squared  0.320 0.578 0.578 0.642 0.630 0.080  0.353  0.082 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  We cluster at the island group level since several of the islands (e.g. 
the Cook Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia) are used as separate observations from a cluster 
of politically related yet geographically distinct islands.            
  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Comparison of different Samples 
Column (1) is the base sample used in the rest of the paper.  Column (2) uses only GDP figures obtained 
from the UN, but includes disaggregation of islands that are part of a group.  Column (3) uses only the raw 
UN GDP data.  Columns (4) and (5) limit the sample to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.  Columns (6) and 
(7) are two stage least squares for each ocean where we instrument for centuries of colonial rule using the 
12 month average and standard deviation of the east-west wind vector for each island. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 















Sample Base  UN  data  - 
disaggregated 
groups 
UN data  Pacific  Atlantic  Pacific - IV  Atlantic-IV
          
Number of centuries a colony  0.450  0.557  0.426  0.522  0.293  0.470  0.600 
 (0.083)**  (0.112)**  (0.110)**  (0.084)** (0.146)+ (0.192)* (0.235)* 
Abs(Latitude)  0.048  0.058 0.064 0.063 0.040 0.064 0.045 
 (0.011)**  (0.013)**  (0.017)**  (0.015)**  (0.017)* (0.015)** (0.015)** 
Area in millions  of sq km  -21.046  -21.621  -22.265  -20.698  -21.685  -19.806  -22.192 
 (3.937)**  (3.902)**  (3.802)**  (1.802)** (6.647)** (4.016)** (6.292)** 
Island is in Pacific   0.779  0.995  1.090         
  (0.457)+  (0.690)  (0.576)+     
Island is in Atlantic   0.615  0.499  0.415         
  (0.400)  (0.581)  (0.527)     
Constant  6.172  5.701 5.708 6.670 7.465 6.710 6.337 
 (0.526)**  (0.755)**  (0.630)**  (0.284)** (0.501)** (0.300)** (0.924)** 
Observations  80  61 61 39 35 39 35 
R-squared  0.578  0.625 0.538 0.553 0.431 0.549 0.332 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the island group level. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  35Table IV 
Possible Mechanisms for GDP – Colonialism Relationship 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Number Of Centuries A Colony  0.393  0.387  0.378  0.313 
  (0.100)** (0.104)** (0.103)** (0.091)** 
No Complex Trade Goods During Colonial Period  -0.435    -0.464  -0.497 
           (0.279)    (0.282)  (0.291)+ 
Mining During Colonial Period    0.492     
   (0.323)     
Organized Agriculture During Colonial Period    0.298     
   (0.295)     
Livestock During Colonial Period    0.094     
   (0.398)     
Agriculture Used Imported Slaves  0.115    0.218   
 (0.369)    (0.388)   
Year Of First Elected  Legislature  0.000      0.000 
  (0.001)    (0.001) 
Had Elected Legislature By 1800      0.288   
     (0.462)   
Had Elected Legislature By 1900      -0.470   
     (0.399)   
Percent  White      0.016 
      (0.008)* 
Percent  Black      0.008 
      (0.007) 
Percent  Mixed      0.018 
      (0.005)** 
Abs(Latitude)  0.044 0.047 0.045 0.042 
  (0.011)** (0.014)** (0.011)** (0.013)** 
Area in millions  of sq km  -22.389  -23.420  -22.125  -25.058 
  (3.985)** (4.658)** (3.154)** (3.755)** 
Island is in Pacific   0.921  0.792  0.820  1.286 
  (0.430)* (0.470)+ (0.455)+  (0.412)** 
Island is in Atlantic   0.578  0.635  0.425  0.306 
  (0.404) (0.384) (0.410) (0.400) 
Constant  5.549 6.145 6.621 5.696 
  (2.351)* (0.517)** (0.583)**  (2.214)* 
Observations  80 80 80 77 
R-Squared  0.600 0.598 0.608 0.686 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the island group level. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%          
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Table V 
The Effect of Colonialism by Colonizing Countries 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Log GDP per Capita  Log GDP per Capita 
Centuries US  1.498   
 (0.346)**   
Centuries Dutch  0.516   
 (0.083)**   
Centuries British  0.411   
 (0.112)**   
Centuries French  0.410   
 (0.124)**   
Centuries Spanish  0.274   
 (0.089)**   
Centuries Portuguese  -0.894   
 (0.157)**   
Centuries German  0.734   
 (1.036)   
Centuries Japanese  -1.097   
 (0.743)   
Centuries British Legal    0.319 
   (0.145)* 
Centuries French Legal    0.391 
   (0.108)** 
Centuries German Legal    0.276 
   (0.544) 
Abs(Latitude) 0.048  0.048 
 (0.014)**  (0.014)** 
Area in millions  of sq km  -18.410  -21.985 
 (4.957)**  (3.983)** 
Island is in Pacific   0.672  0.695 
 (0.543)  (0.515) 
Island is in Atlantic   0.643  0.797 
 (0.473)  (0.458)+ 
Constant 6.264  6.369 
 (0.609)**  (0.586)** 
Observations 80  80 
R-squared 0.629  0.544 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the island group level. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%          
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The Timing of Colonialism 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Log  GDP  per 
Capita 
Log GDP per 
Capita 
Log GDP per 
Capita 
Centuries a Colony before 1700  0.110  -0.001  -0.032 
 (0.169)  (0.201)  (0.207) 
Centuries a Colony after 1700  0.640     
 (0.112)**     
Centuries a Colony 1700-1900    0.930  0.854 
   (0.221)**  (0.198)** 
Centuries a Colony after 1900    0.208  -0.454 
   (0.317)  (0.452) 
Remained a Colony in 2000      0.839 
     (0.251)** 
Abs(Latitude) 0.049  0.047  0.030 
 (0.012)**  (0.011)**  (0.013)* 
Area in millions  of sq km  -19.691  -22.493  -20.067 
 (4.886)**  (5.086)**  (4.692)** 
Island is in Pacific   0.946  1.086  0.915 
 (0.436)*  (0.422)*  (0.382)* 
Island is in Atlantic   0.622  0.580  0.493 
 (0.363)+  (0.351)  (0.317) 
Constant 5.842  5.881  6.456 
 (0.528)**  (0.500)**  (0.529)** 
Observations 80  80  80 
R-squared 0.605  0.623  0.670 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the island group level. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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GDP and Colonialism within Non-island Developing Countries 
We started with the Acemoglu-Robinson-Johnson [2001] database and added our own measure of length of 


















Number of Centuries a Colony  0.401  0.358  0.287  0.232 
  [0.097]** [0.090]** [0.072]** [0.084]** 
Abs(Latitude)   2.952  1.406  1.825 
   [0.883]**  [0.746]+  [0.822]* 
Mean Temperature     -0.023  -0.013  0.005 
   [0.023]  [0.019]  [0.021] 
Expropriation  Risk    0.404   
    [0.067]**   
Log Settler Mortality (AJR)        -0.403 
     [0.093]** 
Constant  7.276 7.344 4.873 9.034 
  [0.215]** [0.686]** [0.682]** [0.728]** 
Observations  64 64 64 60 
R-squared  0.22 0.40 0.63 0.56 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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IV First Stage Regression and Reduced Form Regression 
 
Columns (1) and (2) are OLS.  Column (1) is the first stage regression using our preferred set of 
instruments.  We regress the islands' number of centuries as a colony on the northerly and easterly vectors 
of the island's prevailing wind.  Column (2) is a reduced form in which we show the direct effect of wind 
on modern day GDP. 
 
 (1)  (3) 
 Number  Of 
Centuries A 
Colony 
Log GDP Per 
Capita 
East-West Vector Of Wind  -0.265  -0.139 
 (0.081)**  (0.066)* 
Monthly StDev of East-West Vector  0.885  0.260 
 (0.302)**  (0.255) 
Area in millions  of sq km  10.983  -16.278 
 (4.417)*  (4.810)** 
Abs(Latitude) 0.020  0.060 
 (0.016)  (0.014)** 
Island is in Pacific   -1.684  -0.059 
 (0.387)**  (0.514) 
Island is in Atlantic   0.760 0.768 
  (0.379)* (0.544) 
Constant  -0.013 6.342 
  (0.964) (0.892)** 
Observations  80 80 
R-Squared  0.624 0.440 
F Statistic for Instruments 





Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the island group level.   
  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
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IV Results Using Alternative Sets of Wind Based Instruments 
 
In addition to specifying the prevailing wind as two vectors per island, we also tried several other measures 
of wind speed and direction and used these to instrument for an islands' years of colonization.   Below are 
the second stage results and F-statistics for three different types of wind related instruments.  Column (1) 
takes eight compass headings and measures the knots of prevailing wind along each heading and each 
month.  The instrument is the sum of knots*months that the prevailing wind blew on that heading.  We use 
knot*months along headings 2,4,6,8 as the set of instruments.  In column (2) we use simply the 
knot*months of wind of blowing towards the South West.  Wind on this compass heading is the single 
strongest predictor of an island being discovered and colonized early.  In column (3) we perform a similar 
exercise but limit ourselves to four compass headings and measure the wind as negative if it blew away 
from a compass heading instead of towards it.  In other words, we have only 4 headings but the wind speed 
can be positive or negative.   We use all four points as instruments.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Log  GDP  Capita 
(2SLS) 
Log GDP Capita 
(2SLS) 
Log GDP Capita 
(2SLS) 
Number Centuries a Colony  1.038  0.827  0.703 
 (0.309)**  (0.499)  (0.302)* 
Area in 1000s Sq   -25.488  -23.900  -22.959 
Miles  (4.886)** (5.220)** (4.153)** 
Abs(Latitude)  0.048 0.048 0.048 
  (0.013)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
Island is in Pacific   1.649  1.338  1.154 
 (0.715)*  (0.876)  (0.650)+ 
Island is in Atlantic   0.135  0.307  0.408 
  (0.532) (0.612) (0.467) 
Constant  4.695 5.223 5.536 
  (0.998)** (1.375)** (0.918)** 
Observations  80 80 80 
R-squared  0.282 0.456 0.523 
F Statistic for Instruments in 
First Stage 










Robust standard errors in parentheses       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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List of Islands in Our Dataset 
Island  Group/Country  Other Country  Year First 
Sighted 





Aitutaki  Cook Islands    1789  13             2,814 
Andros, North  Bahamas    1492  479           14,296 
Anguilla  Anguilla    1493  354             9,617 
Antigua  Antigua and Barbuda    1493  349             7,653 
Ascension  Ascension  United Kingdom  1501  82           24,514 
Atiu  Cook Islands    1777  13             1,930 
Barbados  Barbados    1510  384             9,739 
Bermuda  Bermuda    1503  395           53,735 
Bonaire  Netherlands Antilles  Netherlands  1499  478           15,931 
Cuba  Cuba    1492  389             2,535 
Curacao  Netherlands Antilles  Netherlands  1499  492           15,931 
Dominica  Dominica    1493  246             3,484 
East Falkland  East Falkland  United Kingdom  1592  231           24,514 
Efate  Vanuatu    1606  186             1,164 
Fefan  Federated States of Micronesia    1687  101             1,335 
Funafuti  Tuvalu    1819  62             1,204 
Futuna  Futuna  France  1616  117           21,776 
Grand Cayman  Grand Cayman    1503  369           34,173 
Grande Comore  Comoros    1505  88                264 
Grande Terre  Guadeloupe    1493  376  7,900 
Grenada  Grenada    1498  344             3,440 
Guam Guam  United  States  1521  443           34,364 
Hispaniola DOM  Dominican Republic    1492  313             3,029 
Hispaniola HTI  Haiti    1492  331                485 
Huvadu  Huvadu    1558  335             2,151 
Jamaica  Jamaica    1494  168             3,056 
Kadavu  Fiji    1789  95             2,031 
Kosrae  Federated States of Micronesia    1688  101             2,751 
Lifou  Loyalty Islands  New Caldonia  1774  231           12,455 
Luzon  Philippines    1521  297             1,002 
Mahe  Seychelles    1502  220             7,764 
Majuro  Marshall Islands    1526  100             1,896 
Malaita  Solomon Islands    1568  86                791 
Mangaia  Cook Islands    1777  13             2,171 
Mangareva  Gambier Is  French Polynesia  1687  124           13,955 
Manihiki  Cook Islands    1822  13             2,895 
Martinique  Martinique  France  1502  226           21,776 
Mauke  Cook Islands    1823  13             2,493 
Mauritius  Mauritius    1507  359             3,839 
Mayotte  Mayotte  France  1529  161           21,776 
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List of Islands in Our Dataset (continued) 
Island  Group  Other Country  Year First 
Sighted 





Mitiaro  Cook Islands    1823  13             2,734 
Moen  Federated States of Micronesia    1528  87             1,335 
Montserrat  Montserrat    1493  372             8,919 
Nauru  Nauru    1798  78             2,702 
New Britain  Bismarck Archipelago  Papua New Guinea  1616  61                729 
New Caledonia  New Caledonia    1774  231           12,455 
Niue Niue    1774  1  3,600 
North Caicos  Turks and Caicos Islands  United Kingdom  1512  238           24,514 
Oreor  Palau    1710  120             6,076 
Palmerston  Cook Islands    1774  13             2,493 
Penrhyn  Cook Islands    1788  13                989 
Pohnpei  Federated States of Micronesia    1689  101             2,711 
Puerto Rico  Puerto Rico    1493  511           18,047 
Pukapuka  Cook Islands    1595  13                724 
Rakahanga  Cook Islands    1606  13             1,528 
Rarotonga  Cook Islands    1789  13             6,433 
Reunion Reunion    1513  341  6,200 
Rurutu  Austral Islands  French Polynesia  1769  236           13,955 
Saba  Netherlands Antilles  Netherlands  1493  372           15,931 
Saipan Northern  Mariana  Islands  United States  1521  440  12,500 
Sint Maartin  Netherlands Antilles  France  1493  356  16,000 
St Croix  US Virgin Islands  United States  1493  250  11,868 
St Eustatius  Netherlands Antilles  Netherlands  1493  375           15,931 
St Helena  St Helena  United Kingdom  1502  494           24,514 
St John  US Virgin Islands  United States  1493  250  18,012 
St Kitts  St. Kitts and Nevis    1493  360             8,132 
St Lucia  St Lucia    1500  481             4,424 
St Martin  Netherlands Antilles  Netherlands  1493  356           21,776 
St Thomas  US Virgin Islands  United States  1493  250  14,061 
St Vincent  St Vincent and the Grenadines    1498  299             2,891 
Tahiti  Society Islands  French Polynesia  1767  208           13,955 
Tahuata  Marquesas  French Polynesia  1595  5           13,955 
Tarawa  Kiribati - Line Islands    1788  66                538 
Tol  Federated States of Micronesia    1528  101             1,335 
Tongatapu  Tonga    1643  0             1,430 
Tortola  British Virgin Islands  United Kingdom  1493  356           33,671 
Trinidad  Trinidad and Tobago    1498  289             6,347 
Tristan da Cunha  Tristan da Cunha & Gouh  United Kingdom  1506  188           24,514 
Tutuila  American Samoa  United States  1787  175           34,364 
Yap  Federated States of Micronesia    1686  101             2,751 
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Appendix IV 
GDP by Sector 
This is for a subsample of islands in the database.  Source is CIA World Factbook 2002, which in turn uses 
both UN Data and national government statistics from the relevant countries.       
island ocean  GDP  Agriculture  Industry  Services 
Bermuda Atlantic  36  B  1%  10%  89% 
Grand Cayman  Atlantic  1.27 B.  1%  3%  95% 
Jamaica Atlantic  10.21  B.  6%  24%  70% 
Anguilla Atlantic  104  Mill  4%  18%  78% 
New Britain  Pacific  11.4 B.  32%  36%  32% 
Majuro Pacific  115  Mill  14%  16%  70% 
Mauritius Indian  13.85  B.  6%  33%  61% 
US Virgin Islands  Atlantic  2.4 B.  1%  19%  80% 
Tongatapu Pacific  236  Mill  26%  12%  62% 
Pohnpei Pacific  277  Mill  50%  4%  46% 
Montserrat Atlantic  29  Mill  5%  14%  81% 
New Caledonia  Pacific  3.158 B.  5%  30%  65% 
Guam Pacific  3.2  B.  7%  15%  78% 
Cuba Atlantic  31.59  B.  8%  35%  58% 
British Virgin Islands  Atlantic  320 Mill  2%  6%  92% 
St Vincent  Atlantic  339 Mill  10%  26%  64% 
Dominica Atlantic  380  Mill  18%  24%  58% 
Barbados Atlantic  4.496  B.  6%  16%  78% 
Grenada Atlantic  440  Mill  8%  24%  68% 
Kadavu Pacific  5.007  B.  17%  22%  61% 
Martinique Atlantic  6.117  B.  6%  11%  83% 
Puerto Rico  Atlantic  65.28 B.  1%  42%  57% 
Antigua Atlantic  750  Mill  4%  19%  77% 
Tarawa Pacific  79  Mill  30%  7%  63% 
Malaita   Pacific  800 Mill  42%  11%  47% 
St Lucia  Atlantic  866 Mill  7%  20%  73% 
Reunion Indian  9.387  B.  8%  19%  73% 
  44Figure 1 
GDP Per Capita versus Years of Colonialism 
 
Circles represent islands in the Atlantic, triangles are islands in the Pacific and squares are islands in the 
Indian Ocean.  
 
 
  45Figure 2 
Years of Colonialism Versus Easterly Vector of Wind 
 
Circles represent islands in the Atlantic, triangles are islands in the Pacific and squares are islands in the 
Indian Ocean.  
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